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Incentive Design for Temporal Logic Objectives
Yagiz Savas, Vijay Gupta, Melkior Ornik, Lillian J. Ratliff, Ufuk Topcu
Abstract—We study the problem of designing an optimal
sequence of incentives that a principal should offer to an
agent so that the agent’s optimal behavior under the incentives
realizes the principal’s objective expressed as a temporal logic
formula. We consider an agent with a finite decision horizon and
model its decision-making process as a Markov decision process
(MDP). Under certain assumptions, we present a polynomial-
time algorithm to synthesize an incentive sequence that mini-
mizes the cost to the principal. We show that if the underlying
MDP has only deterministic transitions, the principal can hide
its objective from the agent and still realize the desired behavior
through incentives. On the other hand, an MDP with stochastic
transitions may require the principal to share its objective
with the agent. Finally, we demonstrate the proposed method
in motion planning examples where a principal changes the
optimal trajectory of an agent by providing incentives.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a scenario where a principal provides incentives
to an agent so that the optimal behavior of the agent under
the provided incentives satisfies the principal’s objective. If
the principal had enough resources to provide arbitrarily
large incentives, it would be straightforward to obtain the
desired agent behaviour. However, since the resources are
limited in practice, it is important to establish the minimum
amount of incentives that leads to the desired behavior. In this
paper, we are interested in designing a sequence of incentives
that minimizes the cost to the principal while guaranteeing
the realization of its objective by the agent with maximum
probability.
We model the sequential decision-making process of the
agent as a Markov decision process (MDP) [1], and assume
that the agent’s objective is to maximize its expected total
reward at the end of a finite planning horizon. Although
each planning horizon is finite, the agent plans its future
decisions infinitely many times. Examples of such an agent
can be a person who plans her schedule on a weekly basis or
an autonomous system with a limited computational power
which plans its route by considering only a small subset of
all possible environment states.
The principal’s objective is described by a syntactically co-
safe linear temporal logic (LTL) formula. LTL specifications
are widely used to describe complex tasks for autonomous
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robots [2], design security protocols [3] and check the
reliability of software [4]. For example, in a navigation
scenario, syntactically co-safe LTL formulae allow one to
specify tasks such as liveness (eventually visit the region A)
or priority (first visit the region A and then B).
We assume that the principal is aware of the agent’s
reward function and the length of its planning horizon.
In many real-world applications, the decision horizon and
the reward structure of an agent can be known or at least
inferred through observations. For example, a manufacturing
company is generally interested in maximizing its profit at
the end of a fiscal year, and an autonomous car aims to reach
its destination within certain time interval.
From a practical point of view, an interesting question is
whether an adversarial principal can convince an agent to
satisfy its objective through incentives. In such a scenario,
if the agent knows the principal’s objective explicitly, it will
reject the provided incentives because the resulting behavior
under the incentives will serve to the benefit of the enemy.
However, if the principal can design an incentive sequence
without sharing its objective with the agent, then the in-
centives may lead to the desired agent behavior. Therefore,
it is important to establish the conditions under which the
principal can actually hide its objective from the agent.
The contributions of this paper can be summarized as
follows. First, we present an algorithm, based on a series
of linear optimization problems, to synthesize a sequence
of incentives that minimizes the cost to the principal while
ensuring that the optimal agent behavior under the provided
incentives satisfies a syntactically co-safe LTL formula with
maximum probability. Second, we present an example sce-
nario where the principal has to share its objective with
the agent to induce the desired behavior. Third, we provide
sufficient conditions on the structure of the MDP and the
length of the agent’s decision horizon under which there
exists an optimal incentive design that allows the principal
to hide its objective from the agent.
Related work. The problem of obtaining desired agent be-
havior through a sequence of incentives has been extensively
studied in the literature. In [5] and [6], the authors present
methods to design incentive sequences with limited resources
that maximizes the value of the principal’s objective function.
They employ techniques from inverse reinforcement learning
literature and prove NP-hardness of the considered design
problem [5]. The work [7] provides a polynomial-time al-
gorithm to synthesize minimum incentives for inducing a
specific agent policy. Reference [8] considers a bandit model
and presents methods to induce desired agent actions under
different constraints on the incentives. Although it is quite
different from the problem considered here, the design of
feasible incentives that aligns the objectives of an agent and a
principal is discussed in [9] from a control theoretic perspec-
tive. Unlike the references mentioned above, in this paper,
we consider the problem of designing minimum incentives
that maximizes the value of the principal’s objective function
expressed as a temporal logic formula. We also note that
establishing the complexity of the design problem considered
in this paper is mentioned as an open problem in [5].
II. PRELIMINARIES
For a set S, we denote its power set and cardinality
by 2S and |S|, respectively. Additionally, N={1, 2, . . .},
N0={0, 1, 2, . . .} and R≥0=[0,∞).
A. Markov Decision Processes
Definition 1: A Markov decision process (MDP) is a tu-
ple M=(S, s0,A,P ,AP ,L,R) where S is a finite set
of states, s0∈S is an initial state, A is a finite set of
actions, P :S×A×S→[0, 1] is a transition function such that∑
s′∈S P(s, a, s
′)=1 for all s∈S and a∈A(s) where A(s)
denote the available actions in s, AP is a set of atomic
propositions, L:S→2AP is a function that labels each state
with a subset of atomic propositions, and R:S×A→R is a
reward function.
We denote the transition probability P(s, a, s′) by Ps,a,s′ .
Definition 2: For an MDP M, a decision rule
d:S×A→[0, 1] is a function such that
∑
a∈A(s) d(s, a)=1
for all s∈S. A decision rule d is said to be deterministic if
for all s∈S there exists a∈A(s) such that d(s, a)=1, and
randomized otherwise. For an MDP M, we denote the set
of all (deterministic) decision rules by (DD(M)) D(M).
For an MDP M, a decision-maker, i.e., an agent, chooses
a decision rule d∈D(M) at each stage.
Definition 3: An N -stage policy for an MDP M is a se-
quence π=(d1, d2, . . . , dN ) where N≤∞ and dt∈D(M) for
all t≤N . A stationary policy is a policy such that dt=d1 for
all t≤N . A policy is said to be deterministic if dt∈DD(M)
for all t, and randomized otherwise. For an MDP M, we
denote the set of all N -stage policies by ΠN (M). For
notational simplicity, we denote the set of ∞-stage policies
by Π(M).
For an MDPM and a policy π∈Π(M), let µπt (s, a) be the
joint probability of being in state s∈S and taking the action
a∈A(s) at stage t, which is uniquely determined through the
recursive formula
µπt+1(s
′, a′) =
∑
s∈S
∑
a∈A(s)
Ps,a,s′µ
π
t (s, a)dt+1(s
′, a′) (1)
where µπ1 (s, a)=d1(s, a)µ0(s) and µ0:S→{0, 1} is a func-
tion such that µ0(s0)=1 and µ0(s)=0 for all s∈S\{s0}.
Definition 4: For an MDP M and a policy π∈Π(M), the
expected residence time in a state-action pair (s, a) is
ξπ(s, a) :=
∞∑
t=1
µπt (s, a). (2)
An infinite sequence ̺π=s0s1s2 . . . of states generated in
M under a policy π∈Π(M), which starts from the initial
state s0 and satisfies
∑
at∈A(st)
dk(st, at)Pst,at,st+1>0 for
all t≥0, is called a path. Any finite prefix of ̺π a finite
path fragment. We define the set of all paths and finite path
fragments in M under the policy π by Pathsπ(M) and
Pathsπfin(M), respectively. We use the standard probability
measure over the outcome set Pathsπ(M) [10].
Definition 5: An incentive design for an MDP M is a se-
quence Γ=(γ1, γ2, . . .) where γt:S×A→R≥0. A stationary
incentive design is a design such that γt=γ1 for all t∈N. For
an MDP M, we denote the set of all incentive designs by
Θ(M).
B. Linear temporal logic
We consider syntactically co-safe linear temporal logic
(scLTL) formulae to specify tasks and refer the reader to
[10], [11] for the syntax and semantics of scLTL.
An scLTL formula is built up from a set AP of atomic
propositions, logical connectives such as conjunction (∧) and
negation (¬), and temporal modal operators such as until (U)
and eventually (♦). An infinite sequence of subsets of AP
defines an infinite word, and an scLTL formula is interpreted
over infinite words on 2AP . We denote by w|=ϕ that a word
w=w0w1w2 . . . satisfies an scLTL formula ϕ.
For an MDP M under a policy π, a path ̺π=s0s1 . . .
generates a word w=w0w1 . . . where wk=L(sk) for all k≥0.
With a slight abuse of notation, we use L(̺π) to denote
the word generated by ̺π. For an scLTL formula ϕ, the set
{̺π∈Pathsπ(M):L(̺π)|=ϕ} is measurable [10]. Hence, we
define
PrπM(s0 |= ϕ) := Pr
π
M{̺
π ∈ Pathsπ(M) : L(̺π) |= ϕ}
as the probability of satisfying the scLTL formula ϕ for an
MDP M under the policy π∈Π(M).
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
We consider an agent whose sequential decision-making
process is modeled as an MDP M, and a principal that
provides the agent a sequence of incentives Γ∈Θ(M).
The agent’s objective is to maximize its expected total
reward after N stages. However, since the incentive sequence
offered by the principal might be non-stationary, the agent
computes an N -stage policy every N stages. A graphical
illustration of the agent’s planning method is shown in Fig.
1. Formally, let N∈N be a constant, and R(St, At) and
γt(St, At) be the random reward and incentive received in
stage t≤N . Additionally, let J :=(J0, J1, . . .) be a sequence
of objective functions where Jk:ΠN (M)×Θ(M)→R|S| is
such that
Jk(π,Γ)(s) := E
π
s
[ N∑
t=1
(R(St, At) + γkN+t(St, At))
]
for all s∈S where the expectation is taken over the finite
path fragments that are generated by the policy π∈ΠN (M)
and start from the state s. Then, for a given incentive design
1Offers (γ1, . . . , γN ) Offers (γN+1, . . . , γ2N )
Computes pi⋆0
N
Computes pi⋆1
2NImplements pi⋆0
for N stages
Implements pi⋆1
for N stages
Fig. 1: An illustration of the incentive implementation and
the agent’s decision-making process. The principal offers
incentives for the next N stages. After receiving the incen-
tive offers, the agent computes and implements its optimal
decisions for the next N stages.
Γ∈Θ(M), the agent’s optimal ∞-stage policy is given by
π⋆:=(π⋆0 , π
⋆
1 , . . .) where π
⋆
k is such that
π⋆k ∈ arg max
π∈ΠN (M)
Jk(π,Γ)(s) (3)
for all s∈S and k∈N0. Note that the agent’s policy π⋆k
maximizes the total reward starting from any s∈S.
The principal’s objective is to design an incentive sequence
such that the agent’s optimal policy under the provided
incentives satisfies an scLTL formula ϕ with maximum
probability.
The problem that we consider is the synthesis of an in-
centive design that minimizes the cost to the principal while
realizing its objective. We make the following assumptions:
(i) Agent’s reward function R is known by the principal.
(ii) Agent’s decision horizon N is known by the principal.
(iii) The principal pays the offered incentives if and only if
the agent takes the incentivized action.
Then, the optimization problem that we are interested in
to solve is the following:
min
Γ∈Θ(M)
E
π⋆
s0
[ ∞∑
t=1
γt(s, a)
]
(4a)
subject to: π⋆ = (π⋆0 , π
⋆
1 , . . .) (4b)
π⋆k ∈ arg max
π∈ΠN (M)
Jk(π,Γ)(s) ∀s ∈ S, ∀k ∈ N0
(4c)
Prπ
⋆
M(s0 |= ϕ) = max
π∈Π(M)
PrπM(s0 |= ϕ) (4d)
where Γ=(γ1, γ2, . . .).
IV. THE DESIGN OF INCENTIVE SEQUENCES
In this section, we provide a method to synthesize an
incentive design that solves the problem (4a)-(4d). For sim-
plicity, we restrict our attention to reachability specifications,
i.e., ϕ=♦p where p∈AP . The incentive design for general
scLTL specifications is discussed in Section VI.
We first partition the states into three disjoint sets as
follows. Let B⊆S be the set of all states such that {p}⊆L(s),
i.e., the set of states that the principal wants the agent
to reach, and S0⊆S be the set of states that have zero
probability of reaching the states in B under any policy.
More precisely, s∈S0 if Pr
π
M(s |= ♦p)=0 for all π∈Π(M).
Finally, we let Sr=S\B ∪ S0 be the set of all states that
are not in B and have nonzero probability of reaching a
state in B under some policy. These sets can be found in
time polynomial in the size of the MDP using graph search
algorithms [10].
The agent’s initial state s0∈S can belong to either B,
S0 or Sr. However, we only consider the case s0∈Sr since
otherwise the optimal incentive design is trivially γt(s, a)=0
for all t∈N.
A. The cost of control
Recall that the agent’s first objective function
J0:ΠN (M)×Θ(M)→R
|S| is
J0(π,Γ)(s) = E
π
s
[ N∑
t=1
(R(St,At) + γt(St,At))
]
for all s∈S. Let Vn:S→R be the agent’s value function at
stage n such that
Vn(s) := max
π∈ΠN (M)
E
π
s
[ N∑
t=n
(R(St,At) + γt(St,At))
]
for all s∈S, where the expectation is taken over the paths
that occupy s at stage n. Then, we have the recursive formula
Vn(s) = max
a∈A(s)
R(s, a) + γn(s, a) +
∑
s′∈S
Ps,a,s′Vn+1(s
′)
for all 1≤n≤N , where VN+1(s)=0 for all s∈S. Let
Qn:S×A→R be the agent’s Q-function at stage n such that
Qn(s, a) := R(s, a) + γn(s, a) +
∑
s′∈S
Ps,a,s′Vn+1(s
′).
By the principle of optimality [1], [12], the agent’s optimal
policy π⋆0=(d
⋆
1, d
⋆
2, . . . , d
⋆
N ) is such that, for all 1≤n≤N ,
dn(s, a
′)>0 only if
a′ ∈ arg max
a∈A(s)
Qn(s, a).
We recursively define
Qn(s, a) := R(s, a) +
∑
s′∈S
Ps,a,s′V n+1(s
′), (5)
V n(s) := max
a∈A(s)
Qn(s, a), (6)
for all s∈S and a∈A(s). For a given ǫ≥0, we finally define
a real-valued function φǫt :S ×A→R≥0 such that
φǫn(s, a) :=
{
V n(s)−Qn(s, a) + ǫ if s ∈ Sr, a ∈ A(s)
0 otherwise.
For an arbitrarily small ǫ>0, the value of φǫn(s, a), referred
as the cost of control for the state-action pair (s, a), is
the minimum incentive that should be offered to the agent
in order to make the action a∈A(s) uniquely optimal at
stage t. It is worth noting that although the cost of control
φǫn(s, a) depends on the stage number n, it is independent
of the objective number, i.e., it is the same for all Jk.
This is because the agent’s reward function R is stationary,
and therefore, V n(s) and Qn(s, a) do not change with the
objective number k as can be seen from (5)-(6).
B. An ǫ-optimal incentive design
To synthesize the minimum incentive sequence, we should
specify the actions to be incentivized by the principal at each
state for each stage. To this aim, we modify the MDP M
by considering the agent’s decision horizon N as another
dimension in the state-space.
Definition 6: For an MDPM and T={1, 2, . . . , N}, the ex-
panded MDP is a tuple M=(S, s0,A,P ,AP ,L,R) where
• S=S × T ,
• s0=(s0, 1) is the initial state,
• P:S ×A× S→[0, 1] is such that
P(s,n),a,(s′,n′) =
Ps,a,s′ if 1 ≤ n ≤ N − 1 and n′ = n+ 1
Ps,a,s′ if n = N and n
′ = 1
0 otherwise,
• L:S→2AP is such that L((s, t))=L(s) for all s∈S and
for all t∈T ,
and A, AP and R are as defined for M.
We note that the transition function P is defined such that
the agent’s initial state while computing the k-th N stage
policy is the state occupied by the agent at kN+1-st stage
on the expanded MDP.
Let B∪S0∪Sr be the partition of the states of M such
that if s∈B, then (s, n)∈B for all n∈T , and the sets S0
and Sr are defined similarly. Then, the principal’s objective
on M is to induce an agent policy that reaches the set B
with maximum probability. To synthesize an incentive design
under which the optimal agent policy satisfies the desired
property, we modify the expanded MDP M by making its
states s∈B∪S0 absorbing, and denote the resulting MDP by
M
′
. Then, for a given ǫ≥0, we define the cost of control for a
state-action pair on M through the function φǫ:S×A→R≥0
such that
φǫ((s, n), a) :=
{
V n(s)−Qn(s, a) + ǫ if s ∈ Sr, a ∈ A(s)
0 otherwise.
Let Ξ(M
′
)⊆Π(M
′
) be a subset of the set of ∞-stage
policies such that π′∈Ξ(M
′
) if and only if
π′ ∈ arg max
π∈Π(M
′
)
Prπ(s0 |= ϕ), (7)
and for ǫ≥0, fǫ : Ξ(M
′
)→R be a function such that
fǫ(π) := E
π
s0
[ ∞∑
t=1
φǫ(St,At)
]
. (8)
Then, for an arbitrarily small ǫ>0, an ǫ-optimal incentive
sequence can be designed in two steps as follows.
Step 1: Compute V n(s) and Qn(s, a) given in (5)-(6),
and construct the cost of control function φǫ. Then for
the modified expanded MDP M
′
, compute a stationary
deterministic policy π˜=(d˜, d˜, . . .) such that
π˜ ∈ arg min
π∈Ξ(M
′
)
fǫ(π). (9)
Step 2: Let ̺π∈Pathsπ(M) be the path followed by the
agent. At stage kN where N is the agent’s decision horizon
and k∈N0, provide the agent with the incentive sequence
{γ˜1, γ˜2, . . . , γ˜N} such that
• if ̺π[n] 6∈B ∪ S0 for all n≤kN
γ˜n(s, a) :=

φǫ((s, n), a) if s ∈ Sr and d˜((s, n))(a) > 0,
ǫ if s 6∈ Sr and d˜((s, n))(a) > 0,
0 otherwise,
(10)
• γ˜n(s, a):=0 otherwise.
Under the proposed incentive design (10), the agent’s
value function Vn satisfies Vn(s)=V n(s)+(N +1−n)ǫ for
all s∈S, n≤N . Additionally, if ̺π[n] 6∈B∪S0 for all n≤kN ,
then for all s∈S, d˜((s, n))(a)>0 implies that the agent’s Q-
function satisfies
Qn(s, a) = R(s, a) + γ˜n(s, a) +
∑
s′∈S
Ps,a,s′Vn+1(s
′)
= γ˜n(s, a) +Qn(s, a) + (N − n)ǫ
= (N + 1− n)ǫ + V n(s)
> (N − n)ǫ + V n(s) = max
a′∈A(s)\{a}
Qn(s, a
′).
Consequently, the agent is guaranteed to take the incentivi-
tized actions at each stage until reaching the set B∪S0.
We now show ǫ-optimality of the proposed incentive
design. Note that an optimal incentive design, i.e., ǫ=0, does
not exist since choosing ǫ=0 in the cost of control function
φǫn may not make the incentivized action uniquely optimal
for the agent. As a result, the principal may not be able to
control the agent’s actions by offering such incentives.
We need the following technical lemma to state the main
result.
Lemma 1: There exists a policy π˜∈argmin
π∈Ξ(M
′
) f0(π)
such that ξπ˜(s, a)<∞ for all s∈Sr and a∈A(s).
Proof (Sketch): The problem of synthesizing a policy π˜ such
that π˜∈argmin
π∈Ξ(M
′
) f0(π) can be recast as a stochastic
shortest path (SSP) problem with dead ends and zero-cost
loops. Specifically, the dead ends are the states S0 and
zero-cost loops are formed by states Sr. The existence of
stationary policies for such SSP problems can be established
by slightly modifying the statement of Theorem 1 in [13].
Since any stationary policy π∈Ξ(M
′
) is guaranteed to reach
the set B ∪ S0 with probability 1 within finite number of
stages, the result follows. 
Theorem 1: For any given ǫ>0, there exists ǫ>0 such that
min
π∈Ξ(M
′
)
fǫ(π) ≤ min
π∈Ξ(M
′
)
f0(π) + ǫ.
Proof: For any policy π∈Ξ(M
′
) such that ξπ(s, a)<∞ for
all s∈Sr and a∈A(s), we have
fǫ(π) = f0(π) +
∑
s∈Sr
∑
a∈A(s)
ξπ(s, a)ǫ. (11)
Now, for a given ǫ>0, we evaluate both sides of the above
equation at π∈argmin
π∈Ξ(M
′
) f0(π), which satisfies the
condition ξπ(s, a)<∞ due to Lemma 1. Choosing
ǫ =
ǫ∑
s∈Sr
∑
a∈A(s) ξ
π(s, a)
> 0
and taking the minimum of the left hand side of (11) over
the set Ξ(M), we conclude the result. 
We conclude this section by noticing a remarkable prop-
erty of the proposed incentive design. Specifically, to imple-
ment the proposed design (10), the principal should use only
a simple switch mode which offers the same incentives until
the agent reaches the set B∪S0 and shifts all incentives to
zero after the agent either satisfies the principal’s objective
or fails to satisfy it.
V. COMPUTATION OF AN OPTIMAL INCENTIVE DESIGN
In the previous section, we developed a method to syn-
thesize an ǫ-optimal incentive design which require us to
solve a constrained cost minimization problem given in (8).
Specifically, to solve the incentive design problem (4a)-(4d),
one should synthesize a stationary deterministic policy π˜
such that
π˜ ∈ arg min
π∈Ξ(M
′
)
E
π
s0
[ ∞∑
t=1
φǫ(St,At)
]
(12)
In this section, we develop a method to solve the above
optimization problem. For the ease of notation, we consider
an scLTL formula of the form ϕ=♦p. The incentive design
for general scLTL formulae is discussed in Section VI.
A. Construction of the feasible policy space
To solve the problem (12), we first represent the set
Ξ(M
′
) of feasible policies as a set of policies that maximizes
the expected total reward with respect to a specific reward
function.
For a given MDP M, we partition the set of states into
three disjoint sets B, S0, and Sr as explained in Section
IV, and make the states s∈B∪S0 absorbing to form the
modified MDP M
′
. For the modified MDP, we define a
reward function r:S×A→R≥0 such that
r(s, a) =
{∑
s′∈B Ps,a,s′ if s ∈ Sr
0 otherwise.
By making use of the known results, e.g., Theorem 10.100 in
[10], it can be easily shown that for any s∈S and π∈Π(M′),
E
π
s
[ ∞∑
t=1
r(St,At)
]
= Prπ(s |= ϕ)
where ϕ=♦p, p∈AP , and {p}⊆L(s′) if and only if s′∈B.
Let x⋆s:=maxπ∈Π(M′) Pr
π(s |= ϕ). Then, the problem (12)
can be rewritten as
min
π∈Π(M
′
)
E
π
s0
[ ∞∑
t=1
φǫ(St,At)
]
(13a)
subject to: Eπs0
[ ∞∑
t=1
r(St,At)
]
= x⋆s0 . (13b)
B. Synthesis of an optimal stationary deterministic policy
Using Lemma 1, one can formulate the problem (13a)-
(13b) as a linear optimization problem and synthesize
an optimal stationary policy. First, we compute the max-
imum probability of satisfying the specification ϕ, i.e.,
x⋆s0=maxπ∈Π(M′) Pr
π(s0 |= ϕ), by solving a linear program
(LP) [10] (see Chapter 10). Then we solve the following LP
minimize
λ(s,a)
∑
s∈Sr
∑
a∈A
λ(s, a)φǫ(s, a) (14a)
subject to:
∑
s∈Sr
∑
a∈A
λ(s, a)r(s, a) = x⋆s0 (14b)
∀s ∈ Sr,
∑
a∈A(s)
λ(s, a)−
∑
s′∈Sr
∑
a∈A(s)
Ps′,a,sλ(s
′, a) = α(s)
(14c)
∀s ∈ Sr, a ∈ A(s), λ(s, a) ≥ 0 (14d)
where α:S→{0, 1} is a function such that α(s0)=1 and
α(s)=0 for all s∈S\{s0}. The variable λ(s, a) denotes
the expected residence time in the state-action pair (s, a)
[1], [14]. The constraint (14b) ensures that the probability
of satisfying the specification ϕ is maximized, and the
constraints (14c) represent the balance between the “inflow”
to and “outflow” from states.
For each s∈Sr and a∈A(s), let λ⋆(s, a) be optimal de-
cision variables in (14a)-(14d). An optimal stationary policy
π⋆={d⋆, d⋆, . . .} that solves the problem (13a)-(13b) is then
given by
d⋆(s, a) :=
{
λ⋆(s,a)∑
a∈A(s) λ
⋆(s,a) if
∑
a∈A(s) λ
⋆(s, a) > 0
arbitrary otherwise (15)
for s∈Sr, and d
⋆(s, a)=1 for an arbitrary a∈A(s) for s 6∈Sr.
We note that a policy constructed through (15) is ran-
domized in general. One can argue that choosing one of
the actions a∈A(s) such that d⋆(s, a)>0 deterministically
yields an optimal stationary deterministic policy. However,
the following example illustrates that such an approach may
result in an infeasible policy for the problem (14a)-(14d).
Example 1: Consider the MDP given in Fig. 2, where the
cost of control φǫ is such that φǫ(s1, a2)=1 and φ
ǫ(s, a)=0
otherwise. Suppose that the specification is ϕ=♦s2, i.e.,
r(s1, a2)=1 and r(s, a)=0 otherwise. For the LP (14a)-
(14d), a set of optimal decision variables is given by
λ⋆(s0, a1)=2, λ
⋆(s1, a1)=1, and λ
⋆(s1, a2)=1. Therefore,
an optimal policy synthesized through (15) is d⋆(s0, a1)=1,
d⋆(s1, a1)=1/2, and d
⋆(s1, a2)=1/2. Clearly, if we consider
s0 s1 s2
a1, 0
a1, 0
a2, 1
a1, 0
Fig. 2: An MDP example for which arbitrarily choosing one
of the optimal actions and taking it deterministically yields
an infeasible policy.
a deterministic policy such that d(s1, a1)=1, the proba-
bility of satisfying the specification ϕ under this policy
is zero. Hence, choosing an arbitrary action a∈A(s) such
that d⋆(s, a)>0 deterministically violates the constraint and
yields an infeasible policy.⊳
As Example 1 illustrates, a structured approach is required
to synthesize an optimal deterministic policy from the solu-
tion of the LP (14a)-(14d). Let υ⋆ be the optimal value of
the LP in (14a)-(14d). To synthesize an optimal deterministic
policy, we first solve the following LP,
minimize
λ(s,a)
∑
s∈Sr
∑
a∈A
λ(s, a) (16a)
subject to:
∑
s∈Sr
∑
a∈A
λ(s, a)r(s, a) = x⋆s0 (16b)∑
s∈Sr
∑
a∈A
λ(s, a)φǫ(s, a) = υ⋆ (16c)
∀s ∈ Sr,
∑
a∈A(s)
λ(s, a)−
∑
s′∈Sr
∑
a∈A(s)
Ps′,a,sλ(s
′, a) = α(s)
(16d)
∀s ∈ Sr, a ∈ A(s), λ(s, a) ≥ 0. (16e)
From the optimal decision variables λ⋆(s, a) of (16a)-(16e),
an optimal policy π⋆={d⋆, d⋆, . . .} can be generated as
follows. Let A⋆(s):={a∈A(s) : λ⋆(s, a)>0}. If A⋆(s)6=∅,
we choose d⋆(s, a)=1 for an arbitrary a∈A⋆(s), and if
A⋆(s)=∅, we choose d⋆(s, a)=1 for an arbitrary a∈A(s).
Proposition 1: A stationary deterministic policy generated
from the optimal decision variables λ⋆(s, a) of (16a)-(16e)
is a solution to the problem (13a)-(13b).
A proof of Proposition 1 can be found in Appendix I.
Intuitively, the LP in (16a)-(16e) computes the minimum
expected time to reach the set B with probability x⋆s0
with the cost of υ⋆. Therefore, if λ⋆(s, a)>0, by taking
the action a∈A(s), the agent has to “get closer” to the
set B with nonzero probability. Otherwise, the minimum
expected time to reach the set B would be strictly decreased.
Consequently, by choosing an arbitrary action a∈A⋆(s), the
agent is guaranteed to reach the set B with the desired
probability.
VI. INCENTIVE DESIGN FOR GENERAL SCLTL
SPECIFICATIONS
In previous sections, we have developed methods to syn-
thesize ǫ-optimal incentive designs for reachability specifi-
cations ϕ=♦p. For such specifications, the principal induces
the desired agent behavior by sharing only the incentive se-
quences with the agent. In other words, the principal does not
have to inform the agent explicitly about the specification. In
this section, we show that for general scLTL formulae, the
problem (4a)-(4d) may not have a feasible solution, in which
case the principal must share its objective with the agent to
induce the desired behavior.
To solve the problem (4a)-(4d) for general scLTL formu-
lae, one needs to utilize the techniques from automata theory
[10]. In particular, we use the fact that for any scLTL formula
ϕ built up from AP , we can construct a deterministic finite
automata (DFA) Aϕ=(Q, q0, 2
AP , δϕ,F) whereQ is a finite
set of memory states, 2AP is the alphabet, δϕ:Q×2AP→Q is
a transition function and F⊆Q is the set of accepting states
[11]. Then, after forming the expanded MDPM for a given
MDP M and a decision horizon N as explained in Section
IV-B, one can construct the product MDP which is defined
as follows.
Definition 7: LetM=(S, s0,A,P ,AP ,L) be an expanded
MDP and Aϕ=(Q, q0, 2AP , δϕ,F) be a DFA. The product
MDP Mp=(Sp, s0p ,A,P,AP ,Lp,Fp) is a tuple where
• Sp=S×Q,
• s0p = (s0, q) such that q = δ(q0,L(s0)),
• P((s, q), a, (s′, q′))=
{
Ps,a,s′ if q′ = δ(q,L(s′))
0 otherwise,
• Lp((s, q)) = {q},
• Fp=S ×F .
The incentive design problem (4a)-(4d) can now be solved
on the product MDP Mp in three steps. First, we partition
the states of Mp into three disjoint sets. Let B:=Fp, S0 be
the set of states that have zero probability of reaching the
set B, and Sr:=Sp\B ∪ S0. Second, we form the modified
product MDP M′p by making all states B ∪ S0 absorbing.
Finally, we apply the methods developed in Section IV to
synthesize an ǫ-optimal incentive sequence on M′p.
Note that the incentive sequence is designed on the product
MDP Mp. Therefore, the principal must share the DFA
structure, i.e., it’s objective, with the agent to be able to use
the computed design. However, for the existence of a solution
to the problem (4a)-(4d), the incentive sequence should be
designed on the MDP M. The following example illustrates
that the problem (4a)-(4d) may have no feasible solution,
even though the existence of an ǫ-optimal incentive sequence
on Mp is guaranteed.
Example 2: Consider the MDP given in Fig. 3, where
the numbers next to actions ai represent the transition
probabilities, e.g., Ps0,a1,s1=0.4, and the letters next to state
numbers represent labels, e.g., L(s0)=A. Let the agent’s
decision horizon beN=3, and the reward functionR be such
that R(s0, a1)=1 and R(s, a)=0 otherwise. Additionally, let
the principal’s objective be expressed by the scLTL formula
ϕ=♦(B∧♦C), i.e., first visit state B and then state C.
The maximum probability of satisfying ϕ is x⋆0=0.5, which
can be computed by solving an LP [10]. The value x⋆0 is
attainable if and only if the agent takes the action a2∈A(s0)
with probability 1 after visiting state s2.
The principal should decide on which actions to incen-
s0, A
s1, A
s2, B
s3, C
a1, 0.2
a1, 0.4
a1, 0.4
a2, 1
a1, 1
a1, 1
a1, 1
Fig. 3: An MDP example for which there exists no feasible
incentive design for the scLTL specification ϕ=♦(B∧♦C).
tivize in the first three stages t=1, 2, 3 since the agent’s
decision horizon is N=3. Clearly, the action a1 should be
incentivized for t=1, 2 so that the agent visits state s2. At
t=3, the agent will be in state s0 with nonzero probability.
Now, if the principal incentivize a1, the agent will take action
a2∈A(s0) with probability less then 1 after visiting state
s2. On the other hand, if a2 is incentivized, then the agent
cannot satisfy the specification with probability higher than
0.46. Consequently, no incentive design on the given MDP
can guarantee the satisfaction of the specification ϕ with
maximum probability. ⊳
We now present a sufficient condition on the structure of
the MDPM which guarantees the existence of an ǫ-optimal
incentive design on M.
For the product MDP Mp and a policy π∈Π(Mp), let
Mπs,t:={q∈Q:
∑
a∈A µ
π
t ((s, q), a)>0} be the set of occupied
memory states when the agent is in state s∈S at stage t∈N.
Theorem 2: For an MDP M and a decision horizon N , let
S be the finite set of states for the expanded MDP. There
exists an ǫ-optimal incentive design onM if there exists an ǫ-
optimal incentive design onMp such that the agent’s optimal
policy π∈Π(Mp) under the provided incentives satisfies
|Mπs,t|≤1 for all s∈S and t∈N.
Proof: Let Γ be an ǫ-optimal incentive design on Mp with
the desired property. Note that the function in (10) is a
mapping from the expanded MDP M to the MDP M that
preserves ǫ-optimality of the incentive design. Therefore, in
what follows, we construct an incentive mapping from Mp
to M that preserves ǫ-optimality of the incentive design Γ,
and conclude the result.
An ǫ-optimality-preserving mapping ψ such that
Γ′={γ′1, γ
′
2, . . .}:=ψ(Γ) where Γ={γ1, γ2, . . .} is given as
follows. For a given t∈N,
• if |Mπs,t|=0, γ
′
t(s, a):=γt((s, q), a) for an arbitrary q∈Q
and for all a∈A(s),
• if |Mπs,t|=1, γ
′
t(s, a):=γt((s, q), a) for q∈M
π
s,t and for
all a∈A(s). 
The following corollary follows from the fact that the
principal can induce a stationary deterministic agent policy
on the product MDP through the methods explained in
Section V.
Corollary 1: For an MDP M, there exists an ǫ-optimal in-
centive design if Ps,a,s′∈{0, 1} for all s, s′∈S and a∈A(s).
Finally, we provide a sufficient condition on the agent’s
decision horizonN that ensures the existence of an ǫ-optimal
incentive design on M.
Proposition 2: For an MDP M, there exists an ǫ-optimal
incentive design if the agent’s decision horizon is N=1.
Proof (Sketch): There is a one-to-one correspondence be-
tween the paths of the product MDP Mp and the MDP M
[10]. Therefore, the principal can observe the path followed
by the agent on M, and provide the incentives according to
the corresponding path onMp at each stage. Because N=1,
the principal knows the memory state occupied by the agent
at each stage. Consequently, it becomes possible to map the
incentives from Mp to M at each stage. 
VII. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
In this section, we demonstrate the proposed incentive
design methods on two simple motion planning examples.
Considering the availability of off-the-shelf solvers, e.g.,
Gurobi [15], MOSEK [16], that can efficiently solve large-
scale linear optimization problems, we restrict our attention
to small scale examples to better emphasize the properties of
the proposed methods. We synthesize the incentive sequences
for the following examples through the use of MOSEK [16]
solver together with CVXPY [17] interface.
A. Incentives for reachability objectives
In this example, we consider a 5×5 grid world envi-
ronment, shown in Fig. 4, and an agent with decision
horizon N=1. At each state, the agent has four actions, i.e.,
A={left, right, up, down}, and a transition to the chosen
direction occurs with probability 1. If the adjacent state in
the chosen direction is the boundary of the environment, the
agent stays in its current state. A reward function for the
agent is generated by choosing all rewards R(s, a) from the
set {0, 1, . . . , 9} uniformly randomly.
The agent starts from the bottom left corner, i.e., Start
state in Fig. 4, and aims to maximize its immediate reward
at each stage. The principal provides incentives to the agent
so that the agent reaches the top right corner, i.e., Target
state in Fig. 4.
In the absence of incentives, i.e., γt(s, a)=0 for all t∈N,
the agent’s optimal path is shown by blue arrows in Fig. 4.
Under its optimal policy, the agent cycles between two states
infinitely often. Through the methods explained in Section
IV-V, we synthesize an incentive sequence for the agent so
that it reaches the target state with probability 1. The agent’s
optimal path under the provided incentives is shown by red
arrows in Fig. 4. The total cost to the principal is computed
as 9+10ǫ units of resources (UR) where ǫ>0 is an arbitrarily
small constant.
As can be seen from Fig. 4, under the provided incentives,
the agent follows the lowest cost path rather than the shortest
Start
Target
Fig. 4: The motion of an agent on a grid world. The
agent’s decision horizon is N=1, and it starts from the
Start state. The principal’s objective is to induce an agent
policy that reaches the Target state with probability 1. Blue
arrows indicate the agent’s optimal policy in the absence of
incentives, and red arrows indicate the agent’s optimal policy
under the provided incentives.
one to the target state. Specifically, the shortest path would
take 8 stages to reach the target state and cost 12 UR to the
principal, whereas the lowest cost path takes 10 stages to
reach the target and cost 9 UR. Quantitatively, the proposed
incentive design allows the principal to save 25% of the
resources that would be paid to the agent if it was to follow
the shortest path.
B. Incentives for general scLTL specifications
In this example, we consider the same grid world environ-
ment introduced in the previous example with different state
labels. The agent’s decision horizon isN=4, and its objective
is to reach the state labeled as C in Fig. 5. The principal’s
objective is to induce an agent policy that satisfies the scLTL
specification ϕ=♦(A ∧ ♦(B ∧ ♦C)), i.e., the agent should
first visit state A, then B, and then C, with probability 1.
The agent receives the reward of 2 for transitioning to the
top left state and the reward of 5 for transitioning to the top
right state. Its optimal path in the absence of incentives is
shown in Fig. 5 with blue arrows (top path). We synthesize an
optimal incentive sequence under which the agent’s optimal
path is shown in Fig. 5 with red arrows (bottom path).
The total cost of the incentives to the principal is com-
puted as 2+13ǫ units of resources. Specifically, the principal
provides 2+ǫ incentives for the right action in the start state
and then ǫ incentives at each stage for desired actions. An
interesting property of the incentivized (red) path is that the
agent stays in the same state in third stage by taking down
action. This is due to the fact that the state s on the left of the
state labeled as B has value Vn(s)=0 for all n. Therefore,
the principal wants that state to be the agent’s initial state
when it computes its second 4-stage policy. By doing so, the
principal ensures that the states s′ occupied by the agent in
the next 4 stages will always have a value zero, i.e., Vn(s
′)=0
if
∑
a∈A(s′) µ
π
4+n(s
′, a)>0, and therefore the cost of control
will only be ǫ.
Start
A
B
C
Fig. 5: The motion of an agent on a grid world. The agent’s
decision horizon is N=4, and it starts from the Start state.
The principal’s objective is to induce an agent policy that
satisfies the scLTL specification ϕ=♦(A∧♦(B ∧♦C)), i.e.,
first visit A, then B, and then C. The optimal path of the
agent in the absence of incentives is shown by blue arrows
(top path). Red arrows indicate the agent’s optimal path under
the provided incentives (bottom path).
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
We considered a principal-agent model and studied the
problem of designing an optimal sequence of incentives that
the principal should offer to the agent in order to induce
a desired agent behavior expressed as a syntactically co-
safe linear temporal logic (scLTL) formula. For reachability
objectives, we presented a polynomial-time algorithm to
synthesize an incentive design that minimizes the cost to the
principal. By providing an example scenario, we showed that
a feasible incentive design may not exists for general scLTL
formulae, and the principal may need to share its objective
with the agent to induce the desired behavior. Furthermore,
we provided sufficient conditions under which the principal
can induce the desired behavior without sharing the scLTL
formula with the agent.
The results that we present in this paper are obtained under
the assumptions that the agent’s reward function and the
length of its decision horizon are known by the principal.
An interesting future direction may be to develop methods
to infer the length of the agent’s decision horizon through
perfect/imperfect observations, or to design an incentive
sequence that does not require the knowledge of the length
of the decision horizon.
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APPENDIX I
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Note that any deterministic policy constructed from the
optimal decision variables λ⋆(s, a) of (16a)-(16e) can only
violate the reachability constraint (14b). In other words, the
constructed policy is guaranteed to minimize the expected
total cost.
We will need the following result to prove Proposi-
tion 1. For a given policy π, let Reachπ(s, s′) denote
the probability of reaching s′ from s under π. Note
that Reachπ(s, s)=
∑
a∈A(s) d(s, a)Reach
π((s, a), s) where
Reachπ((s, a), s) is the probability of reaching state s from
state action pair (s, a) under the policy π. Finally, let
ξπ(s):=
∑
a∈A(s) ξ
π(s, a), and note that for any ξπ(s)<∞,
we have [18]
ξπ(s) =
Reachπ(s0, s)
1−
∑
a∈A(s) d(s)(a)Reach
π((s, a), s)
. (17)
To prove the claim of Proposition 1, we show that any
policy that is constructed by choosing actions a∈A(s) such
that λ⋆(s, a)>0 deterministically is optimal.
Let π={d, d, . . .} be the stationary randomized policy
constructed from λ⋆(s, a) of LP (16) through the formula
(15). Additionally, let π˜={d˜, d˜, . . .} be a stationary random-
ized policy such that d˜(s⋆, a⋆)=1, and d˜(s)=d(s) for all
s∈S\{s⋆}. Informally, in state s⋆, we choose one of the
active actions deterministically and do not change the rest
of the policy.
We first show that Prπ˜(s0|=ϕ)<x⋆s0 implies
Reachπ˜((s⋆, a⋆), s⋆)=1. Then by showing that
Reachπ˜((s⋆, a⋆), s⋆)=1 cannot be true, we conclude
that Prπ˜(s0|=ϕ)=x⋆s0 .
As for the first claim, suppose for contradiction that
Prπ˜(s0|=ϕ)<x⋆s0 and Reach
π˜((s⋆, a⋆), s⋆)<1. Note that
if Reachπ˜((s⋆, a⋆), s⋆)<1, then Reachπ˜(s⋆, s⋆)<1.
Therefore, Reachπ˜(s, s)<1 for all s∈Sr satisfying
Reachπ˜(s⋆, s)>0. Additionally, as d(s′)=d˜(s′) for all s′
such that Reachπ˜(s⋆, s′)=0, we have Reachπ˜(s′, s′)<1.
Consequently, probability of leaving the set Sr is 1. Since
all actions that are chosen by policy π˜ satisfy x⋆s=Ps,a,s′x
⋆
s′
where x⋆s is the maximum probability of reaching the set B
from the state s (see e.g. Chapter 10 in [10]), probability
of entering the set B must be equal to x⋆s0 . This raises a
contradiction.
As for the second claim, suppose that
Reachπ˜((s⋆, a⋆), s⋆)=1. Then, Reachπ((s⋆, a⋆), s⋆)=1
since π differs from π˜ only in the state s⋆. We now
construct a policy πˆ such that dˆ(s)=d(s) for all s∈S\{s⋆},
dˆ(s⋆, a⋆)=0, and
dˆ(s⋆, ai) =
d(s⋆, ai)∑
a∈A(s⋆)\{a⋆} d(s
⋆, ai)
. (18)
Note that πˆ satisfies Prπˆ(s0|=ϕ)=x⋆s0 . By showing that πˆ
attains an objective value in (16) that is strictly smaller than
the policy π, we will conclude that Reachπ˜((s⋆, a⋆), s⋆)=1
cannot be possible.
For the ease of notation, let ai:=d(s
⋆, ai),
Ri:=Reach
π((s⋆, ai), s
⋆), and aˆi:=dˆ(s
⋆, ai), and
Rˆi:=Reach
πˆ((s⋆, ai), s
⋆). Without loss of generality,
we choose a1=a
⋆. By the construction of πˆ, it can be
shown that
ξπˆ(s⋆) = (1− a1)ξ
π(s⋆)−
a1(R1 − 1)(1− a1)
C
(19)
where C:=(1−
∑n
i=1 aiRi)(1− a1 −
∑n
i=2 aiRi)>0. Note
that ξπˆ(s⋆, ai)(1 − a1)=ξπ(s⋆, ai) due to (18). Then, since
a1>0 and R1=1, we have
ξπˆ(s⋆, ai) ≤ ξ
π(s⋆, ai) (20)
for all ai i=2, 3, . . . , n and ξ
πˆ(s⋆, a1)<ξ
π(s⋆, a1). Conse-
quently, πˆ attains an objective value in (16) that is strictly
smaller than the policy π.
Finally, since Reachπ((s⋆, a⋆), s⋆)=1 cannot be
true, Reachπ˜((s⋆, a⋆), s⋆)=1 cannot be true. If
Reachπ˜((s⋆, a⋆), s⋆)=1 is not true, Prπ˜(s0|=ϕ)<x⋆s0 is
not true. This concludes the proof. 
